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SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
A. The Industrial Commission's failure to allocate 
temporary total compensation and medical benefits is inconsistent 
with its award of permanent partial disability compensation to 
both Mr. Maupin and Mr. Sweeney, making the findings arbitrary and 
capricious. 
Case No. 20460 
Case No. 20474 
B. Utah Code Annotated, Sect. 35-1-69, prescribes a 
formula for determining the Second Injury Fund's contributions to 
employers in cases of combined disability, 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE SECOND INJURY FUND'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
"SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER TEST" WAS NOT MET BY 
THE EMPLOYERS IN BOTH OF THESE CONSOLIDATED 
CASES IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE COMMISSION'S 
OWN FINDINGS. 
As was clearly pointed out by the Second Injury Fund in 
its brief, the Second Injury Fund was required to pay the appli-
cant David D. Sweeney compensation for permanent partial impair-
ment in the amount of $6,722,00 and was also required to pay the 
applicant Mike Maupin compensation for permanent partial impair-
ment in the amount of $2,347. These awards were made by the 
Administrative Law Judge and upheld by the Commission based on the 
medical panel's assessment of the percentage of pre-existing 
incapacity in both the applicants. 
While it is the employers' and the State Insurance 
Fund's position in these cases that the 1981 amendments to 
Section 69 require an absolute allocation of temporary total 
compensation and medical benefits where the 10/20 Rule is met (See 
appellants' brief at pgs. 5-9) even if the Second Injury Fund 
argument is correct that the 10/20 Rule does not give an absolute 
standard for determining substantially greater, the award of 
Second Injury Fund benefits for permanent partial incapacity to 
each of the applicants can only be done under the statute if the 
2 
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of 10% or greater and the total physical impairment from all 
causes and conditions is greater than 20% pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Sect. 35-1-69(1)(b); or 
3. The Industrial Commission makes a finding that the 
permanent incapacity is substantially greater than it would have 
been had not the pre-existing incapacity been present. See: Days 
MarKetr Inc»r 669 P.2d at 442. 
In the instant cases, both Mr. Maupin and Mr. Sweeney 
meet the later two criteria. Both applicants for workers1 
compensation had pre-existing incapacities, both had industrial 
injuries resulting in permanent physical impairment greater than 
10%, and both had total permanent physical impairment in excess of 
20%. Additionally, both applicants for workers' compensation, by 
implication from the Industrial Commission's award of Second 
Injury Fund benefits for their pre-existing permanent physical 
impairments, have suffered substantially greater impairments as a 
result of their pre-existing conditions. Clearly, the Industrial 
Commission is not in a position to award Second Injury Fund 
benefits for permanent impairments without also meeting the 
substantially greater test, which is argued in the Second Injury 
Fund brief. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY BY 
AWARDING PERMANENT COMPENSATION BUT FAILED TO 
ALLOCATE MEDICAL CARE AND TEMPORARY COMPEN-
SATION BASED UPON THE COMBINED INJURIES. 
The Second Injury Fund, in its brief, made several 
references to the percentage of medical care and temporary total 
4 
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the Second Injury Fund to argue that the allocations in these two 
cases would be "unfair". 
CONCLUSION 
The State Insurance Fundf as compensation carrier for 
both Mr. Maupinfs and Mr. Sweeney's employers, is entitled to 
allocation of temporary total compensation and medical benefits 
because in both cases, the combined impairments meet the statu-
torily defined standard for substantially greater, i.e. both have 
10% or greater permanent incapacity as a result of the industrial 
accident and combined incapacities in excess of 20%. In addition, 
both applicant's for workers' compensation have permanent incapa-
cities that are substantially greater than they would have been 
but for the pre-existing incapacities by virtue of the Commis-
sion's award of permanent partial compensation to each of the 
applicants from the Second Injury Fund for the incapacities 
resulting from pre-existing conditions. 
When the determination of "substantially greater" has 
been made either under the statutory 10/20 formula or, because the 
Commission made an award for permanent incapacities based on 
pre-existing conditions, it is the absolute duty of the Commission 
under the statute to allocate medical expenses and temporary total 
compensation based on the combined disabilities. 
DATED this WrTL day of August, 1985. 
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